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Interest organizations across
economic sectors: explaining interest
group density in the European Union
Joost Berkhout, Brendan J. Carroll, Caelesta Braun,
Adam W. Chalmers, Tine Destrooper, David Lowery,
Simon Otjes and Anne Rasmussen
ABSTRACT The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy
domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes
of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest
organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political
and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation,
we show that economic institutions structure the ‘supply’ of interest organizations
by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying
and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not
find consistent evidence that political institutions produce ‘demand’ for interest
organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This
is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices.
The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, rela-
tively independent from public policy or institutions.
KEY WORDS Business interest representation; European Union; interest groups;
lobbying
INTRODUCTION
Systematic studies of interest group mobilization in the European Union (EU),
i.e., large-N studies examining the number and type of interest groups politi-
cally active in the EU, have become more common recently (e.g., Broscheid
and Coen 2007; Messer et al. 2010; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013). Also
beyond the EU case, there has been a marked increase in recent years in
studies of interest group populations. These studies examine the density and
diversity of interest organizations in political systems as a whole as well as
sub-units within them, such as political issues, policy domains and economic
sectors (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Gray and Lowery 1996b; Halpin
and Jordan 2012; Lowery and Gray 2015). Such attention is not surprising.
The density of interest organizations within a given economic sector, issue
area or policy domain is highly important for several reasons. Density has
# 2015 Taylor & Francis
Journal of European Public Policy, 2015
Vol. 22, No. 4, 462–480, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008549
been shown to affect both the strategy and (potential) influence of interest
organizations (e.g., Beyers and and Kerremans 2007; Lowery, Gray and
Monogan 2008), the breadth of policy engagement of interest groups (e.g.,
Halpin and Thomas 2012) and the opportunities for entry of new organizations
to the interest group system (Gray and Lowery 1996a). Thus, understanding
what drives variation in densities between economic sectors could help shed
light on a variety of issues associated with interest representation. In this collec-
tion, Kluver and Mahoney (2015), for instance, hypothesize the diversity of
groups in a policy debate to affect nature of the frames used, and Bernhagen
et al. (2015) use a legislative ‘side’ density measure to explain positional align-
ment with the European Commission . This is the conceptual link to the strat-
egy and influence components of the INTEREURO project of which the
underlying research is a part.1
Density also has societal relevance. Olson (1982: 41–69), for example, argues
that economic sectors (and societies more broadly) will eventually ‘decline’
when too many interest organizations seek to maintain the policy status quo,
defend their narrow interests and, thereby, lead the political process to deadlock.
According to such an argument, also common in popular accounts of the EU,
the size and scope of the interest system has potential consequences for the
eventual success of the political system as a whole and the society it serves.
One of the key observations of population density studies is that there is a
great deal of variation in the density (i.e., number) of interest groups when
system-level data are broken down into sub-units; that is, regardless of
whether the population is disaggregated by issues, economic sectors or policy
domains, the distribution of the number of active interest organizations is
highly skewed (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Halpin 2011). At the
level of economic sectors, for example, this means that interest organizations
sometimes have a representational monopoly with only a single interest organ-
ization working in a particular economic sector, whereas in other sectors a large
number of diverse types of interest organizations are active. This has led LaPira
et al. (2014) to speak of ‘two worlds of lobbying’: one with niche, low-number
lobbying at the periphery; another with intense bandwagon lobbying at the core
of the United States (US) interest system. Interest group density in the more
explicitly multi-level governance system of the EU is also highly skewed.
Richardson and Coen (2009: 348), for example, use the term ‘chameleon plur-
alism’ to denote similar lobbying differences in the number of groups between
policy domains in the EU (see also Broscheid and Coen [2007]; Coen and Kat-
saitis [2013]; Rasmussen et al. [2014]). Such skewed distributions complicate
the general normative assessment of lobbying in democratic political systems
because lobbying may be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on the sector-specific situ-
ation in which it occurs.
Previous research on the EU interest population, and on EU interest represen-
tation more broadly, has sought to explain such differences on the basis of insti-
tutional factors – such as institutional patronage by the European Commission
(e.g., Greenwood 2007; Mahoney 2004; Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011;
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Sanchez Salgado 2014). Considering the unique institutional structure of the
EU, this emphasis on the demand for lobbying is a convincing point of depar-
ture and is supported by empirical evidence. This is especially case for studies on
group strategies for which such explanations are theoretically more proximate
than for studies on population density. At the same time, the EU may be a
very likely case to find effects of political institutional demand for lobbying,
and, owing to the multi-level, cross-national character, a relatively unlikely
case to find that socioeconomic ‘supply’ factors such as the potential number
of constituents, to produce substantial variation in lobby presence. Compared
to national cases, in the EU there is a relatively long causal chain between
‘supply’ factors and the actual lobbying venue. This implies that when we
find support for supply-side explanations in the EU, such explanations are
also likely to be valid in other political systems. Further, the omission of
supply-side factors in several assessments of group density in the EU may
leave such existing models substantially underspecified. We provide a theoretical
justification and detailed analysis of supply factors while also including demand-
side factors highlighted in earlier research. Our focus on the economic base of
the EU interest group system casts new light on ‘old’ discussions on whether
groups anticipate or react to European integration (e.g., Wessels 2004) and,
in the relation to this collection, broadens the interest group ‘context’ beyond
their institutional targets of influence.
We focus on density per economic sector rather than policy domain, interest
guild or the legislative proposals sampled in the INTEREURO project. In con-
ceptual terms, economic sectors most closely match the tightly defined sub-
population required to plausibly assume (critical resource) competition
among organizations. In population ecology terms, the economic sector is
more likely to be the ‘selective environment’ of ‘like-groups’ in need of
similar scarce resources than policy domain or legislative proposal (see the dis-
cussion in Lowery [2011: 50, 54]).
We use a novel dataset compiled by the authors on interest group presence in
the European Parliament in the period 2009–10. In total, 1,425 (out of 2,070)
organizations in the Parliament’s door pass registry have been classified by econ-
omic sector based on information provided online, resulting in density figures
for 88 economic sectors, of which 57 are included in the multivariate analysis
(694 organizations). Our empirical research does not cover interest represen-
tation in the public, semi-public or non-business sectors. We begin by discuss-
ing the existing literature and presenting our theoretical expectations.
Thereafter, we lay out our research design and data, before conducting our
empirical analysis and concluding.
THEORY: SUPPLY AND DEMAND APPROACHES TO DENSITY
Difference in numbers of interest organizations may be related to the policy
process (‘demand side’) or the population/membership environment (‘supply
side’). Coen and Katsaitis (2013) exemplify a demand focus. They suggest
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that the varying informational demands of different sections of the EU bureauc-
racy and the substantive nature of policy (regulatory or (re)distributive) explain
the number of interest organizations at the policy domain level. Lowery et al.
(2005: 68), as an example of supply-oriented research, find that ‘economies
of scale in interest representation closely reflect economies of scale in industrial
production’. This implies that factors such as the size and structure of specific
markets (e.g., such as determined by its geographical limits or the number of
establishments) should be regarded as the ultimate causes of observed patterns
of interest representation.
We first discuss the supply-side factors at some length, and only briefly
describe the conceptual rationale of the demand-side factors. Some of the argu-
ments about demand-side factors are already precisely described as ‘policy and
polity contextual factors’ in the outline of this collection and other arguments
do not require elaborate restatement, as they are already substantively developed
in previous studies (e.g., Broscheid and Coen 2007; Leech et al. 2005).
THE SUPPLY OF INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS
Population ecology approaches place heavy emphasis on supply side factors in
accounting for interest group density. The key underlying proposition of
such approaches is that the number of interest organizations in a given environ-
ment is constrained by the availability of organizational resources, relatively
independent of mobilization rates and dependent on the pre-existing density
of organizations (e.g., Gray and Lowery 1996b: 40–1; Halpin and Jordan
2009). These propositions directly contradict the notions of an indeterminate
growth of interest organizations (e.g., Olson 1982: 38–41) and an exclusive
focus on mobilization practices to infer population level ‘bias’ (e.g., Olson
1965). Instead, population ecologists focus on environmental factors in con-
junction with distinct growth patterns of sectors (‘density dependence’) to
explain differences in numbers of organizations in a given sector or polity. Selec-
tive pressures ensure that not all interest organizations survive, and such press-
ures increase when populations become more crowded. The population ecology
approach posits that survival of interest organizations depends on the ‘energy’
available in the organizational environment (here: demand) and the ‘area’ or
potential size of the environment on which the organization relies (here:
supply side).
First, the number of interest organizations (or density) in a given economic
sector ultimately depends on the availability of organizational resources in a
sector (Lowery and Gray 1995). Without farmers there cannot be a farmers’
association. Interest organizations require constituents. A large number of
potential constituents provide opportunities for larger numbers of organiz-
ations. The abundance of organizational resources produces more organizations
rather than a few big organizations, because a larger number of constituents will
allow specialists to inhabit narrower, more specific niches that are not viable
with fewer constituents (Gray and Lowery 1996a). However, there is an
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important caveat here. Even in cases with near infinite resources, at some point
the number of interest organizations will stop growing because the marginal
utility of ever-more specialized interest organizations declines with density
(Lowery and Gray 1995; Nownes and Lipinski 2005). In other words, the
growth of the number of organizations depends on the pre-existing density of
organizations in an economic sector. The number of potential constituents
may be measured by the number of establishments in a given economic
sector (Leech et al. 2005: 23; Lowery et al. 2005).
Constituents hypothesis: The density of interest organizations within econ-
omic sectors is positively related, but at a declining rate, with the number
of potential constituents of the sectors.
We now turn to the second supply-side factor derived from population ecology.
Lowery, et al. (2005: 47) refer to the classic argument of Schattschneider (1960)
that better-endowed interests are more likely to organize themselves. While
Lowery and Gray (1995) and Lowery et al. (2005) have found little support
for this hypothesis in within sector, cross-jurisdiction tests, it remains a viable
and often cited hypothesis with respect to differences in political activity
among economic sectors (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Two related argu-
ments support this expectation. First, and most obviously, it is plausible that
the availability of slack resources per firm – a by-product of wealth – in a
given sector might lead to supporting a larger number of interest organizations
representing that sector. But a second interpretation, or rather implication, of
this bears directly on our first hypothesis on density dependence: that is, the
relationship between number of enterprises in an economic sector and its econ-
omic value added is likely to vary across economic sectors. For some, relatively
few enterprises will each share a great deal of value added (e.g., banks) in com-
parison to other economic sectors (e.g., restaurants). This means that to secure
valid estimates for the density dependence hypotheses in cross-sector analyses
like ours, we must control for these variations in the economies of scale or
wealth of sectors. We do so by including an indicator of sector wealth in the
model – the economic value added per enterprise of an economic sector – to
test the following hypothesis.
Wealth hypothesis: The density of interest organizations is positively related
to the wealth of the potential constituents in a sector.
Third, in the case of a within-system, cross-sector analysis of interest system
density in the European Union, an additional characteristic of the market
should be included in the ‘supply’ term of the model. For some economic
sectors, such as the production of consumer electronics or cars, there is a
single European or even world market. In other sectors, in contrast, such as
health care or postal services, the market is geographically fragmented along
national borders. Historically, European-level collective action by business
occurs especially in economic sectors with strong economic interests in cross-
border trade, such as those with large proportions of export-oriented producers,
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cross-border supply chains and high fixed costs (e.g., Cowles 2002). In other
words, whether economic actors in a given sector collaborate at a certain geo-
graphical level depends on the level at which relevant economic transactions
take place. As early neo-functionalists (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) noted,
these joint activities in such markets at some point orient themselves towards
the European policy process. Economic sectors differ in the geographical level
of integration of the market. We should find higher numbers of interest organ-
izations in sectors for which there is a European or world playing field than in
nationally bounded markets.
Market integration hypothesis: The density of interest organizations is positively
related to the degree of European market integration of economic sectors.2
In sum, the ‘supply’ of interest organizations in a given sector depends on the
number of potential constituents, their resources and the level of European
market integration.
The interaction between interest organizations potentially affects the density
of organizations. This may be seen as a special category of supply-side factors.
Previous research indicates that economic sectors differ in the extent to which
organizations represent their own interests (as institutions) or whether they
(also) have associations represent their interests (e.g., Hansen et al. 2005;
Lowery et al. 2005: 72).
Institutions hypothesis: The density of interest organizations is positively
related to the proportion of institutions in an economic sector.3
Furthermore, one of the proposed mechanisms that produce the skewed distri-
bution of interest organizations across economic sectors is that ‘information cas-
cades’ produce bandwagons of interest group activity (Baumgartner and Leech
2001; Halpin 2011). Such information cascades probably work through so-
called ‘cue givers’ such as the media, keystone groups, civil service or campaign
groups (Halpin 2011: 221–2); that is, as Baumgartner et al. (2009: 253) note,
‘initial actions may have powerful effects on subsequent actions, and the actions
of key players in the process may send cues to scores of others, all of whom may
change their behavior’. In the EU case, umbrella groups are probably very
important first movers early in the policy process and therewith act as cue
givers for their members. This implies that the density of interest organizations
is positively related to the presence of umbrella groups in an economic sector.
Cue-givers hypothesis: The density of interest organizations is positively
related to the presence of umbrella groups in an economic sector.
DEMAND-SIDE FACTORS
With regard to the demand side, the number of organizations in a given econ-
omic sector also depends on the ‘demand’ from government for interest
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representation. Some economic sectors are more intensely affected by govern-
ment policies and, consequently, will support a greater number of interest
organizations. This argument originates from population ecology (in which it
is called ‘energy’), but also has broader resonance in theoretically eclectic
models on density; further, as said, as policy and institutional factors are very
common in explanatory models on group strategies. We are mainly concerned
about difference in the degree of government activity rather than a difference in
the kind of political institutional action, such as the specific institution involved,
the regulatory/distributive nature of the policy and so on. Such differences are
included in the general framework of this collection as explanation for strategies
and influence regarding EU institutions. The relatively aggregate level of analy-
sis of our research design makes it difficult to include them in our analysis.
Specific policy-related factors are also theoretically relatively proximate in expla-
nations of group strategies or policy influence, but more distant in their poten-
tial effects on population density. We therefore formulate relatively crude and
more general expectations than the other contributions to this collection.
In general terms, government activity has been shown to be a very strong pre-
dictor of political activities on the part of interest organizations (Baumgartner
et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Gray et al. 2005; Leech et al.
2005: Lowery et al. 2004).
EU policy activity hypothesis: The density of interest organizations is posi-
tively related to the total level of EU regulation and EU spending on policies
relevant to an economic sector.
Some authors, especially in the EU case, point out that institutional demand, in
terms of information needs on the part of administrators, draws interest groups
into the policy process (e.g., Bouwen 2002). Such needs vary depending on
internal departmental capacity (staff) to generate policy information. As
argued by Coen and Katsaitis (2013), this implies that large numbers of staff,
which also indicates government activity, reduce information needs and reduce
institutional demand for interest organizations.
Information needs hypothesis: The density of interest organizations is posi-
tively related the information needs of administrators relevant to an economic
sector.
In sum, the demand for interest organizations on the part of EU institutions
should be reflected in the stock of legislative output, the amount of government
spending and the information needs of policy-makers.
MODELLING ISSUES, DATA AND VARIABLE
OPERATIONALIZATION
The dependent variable of this analysis is the number of interest organizations
active in the European Parliament (EP) per economic sector. We rely on a list of
registered interest representatives with a door pass card to the buildings of the
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European Parliament. We use a snapshot of this list and focus on organizations
registered at any moment in 2009. A benefit of the Parliament register is that we
know that actors in the list have demonstrated at least a minimal level of politi-
cal activity oriented towards a key European institution. Remember that ‘politi-
cal interest’ is commonly part of any definition of ‘interest groups’ (e.g., Beyers
et al. 2008), as noted on the US case ‘the most valid indicator of broadscale pol-
itical activity now available is provided by lobby registration rolls’ (Gray and
Lowery 1996b: 7). This is not necessarily the case for organizations listed in
Dod’s Public Affairs Directory or those which have registered themselves in
the general Transparency Register (Greenwood and Dreger 2013) (for a more
elaborate discussion of the differences between these sources, see Berkhout
and Lowery [2008]; Rasmussen and Carroll [2013]; Wonka et al. [2010]).
Based on website information, we classify these organizations into economic
sectors for the density measure and by organizational type to measure the pres-
ence of European-level umbrella groups and of individual institutions. Note
that the indicators for our independent variables do not change much on a
year-to-year basis, whereas they show much cross-sectional variation. While
we do have EP door pass data for a longer time period (2005–10), we therefore
prefer the simpler cross-sectional design of a single, ‘average’ year.4 A substan-
tively useful time series model requires valid and reliable data over decades
rather than years. Such data are not available (but see Berkhout and Lowery
[2010]; Sorurbakhsh [2014]; Toshkov et al. [2012]).
A number of sectors are excluded from the analysis. To start, we only include
organizations that can be classified in one of the categories of the ISIC classifi-
cation of economic activities (i.e., this excludes ‘social’ or ‘public’ sectors).5 We
also leave out the ISIC sectors for which we cannot differentiate between ‘in-
house’ and ‘client’ lobbying. These are, most importantly, the legal activities,
consultancy and information services sectors. We do not know whether firms
in these sectors, such as Allen and Overy or PriceWaterhouseCoopers, act as
‘lobby firms’ on behalf of others (inflating the density measure of the consul-
tancy sector) or plead for a certain cause of their own, such as accountancy regu-
lation. Furthermore, several sectors are dropped because of lack of data on the
main explanatory factors; that is, Eurostat only provides market structure infor-
mation on the so-called ‘business economy’, including industry, construction
and services, but no such data on other sectors like agriculture, forestry and
fishing, as well as public administration and ‘largely non-market services such
as education and health’ (Eurostat 2009: 5). Data on financial services are
also missing; however, this is owing to a general ‘lack of standard business stat-
istics’ for this sector (Eurostat 2009: 5).6 The exclusion of several strongly regu-
lated and semi-public sectors increases the reliability and the internal validity of
our data. However, because we cannot measure the full scale of the demand-side
factors (i.e., from light to heavily regulated sectors), it may bias our results in
favour of supply-side factors. It also reduces the external validity of the study
in terms of the generalizability beyond non-business sectors. Our data pertain
to business sectors only (about half of the interest group population), although,
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theoretically, our expectations apply to non-business sectors as well. This is a
limitation of the underlying study and a challenge for future research. Our
Appendix (see Supplemental Data) provides a full list of the 57 sectors included
and further information on the coding procedure.
The size of the constituency is measured by the number of enterprises in a
given sector. Wealth is operationalized by turnover per enterprise. The data
are collected from Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (Eurostat 2009).
This is also the case for the market integration hypothesis that we measure by
net flows of direct investment per sector within the EU-27.
In order to assess the ‘demand’ effects in economic sectors, we link policy
domains to economic sectors. The policy process and the economy can only
be linked in an imperfect manner. Policies are sometimes aimed at specific
sectors (e.g., the Common Agricultural Policy), have a multi-sector character
(e.g., economic innovation programmes), and/or indirectly affect a whole
range of sectors (e.g., labour market policy). We link economic sectors to Euro-
pean Parliamentary legislative fields and to policy areas of the Directorate-Gen-
erals (DG) of the European Commission (EC).
First, the legislative fields are linked to economic sectors using a Boolean
search in Eurlex’s search engine (which contains all EU legislation). The
Boolean search logic uses the full descriptions of each economic sector as out-
lined by the ISIC classification scheme. These descriptions provided a string
of key terms for all activities covered by a specific economic sector, as well as,
in some instances, several that were explicitly not covered. These key terms
are then used to search in both (1) the titles of legislation, as well as (2) the
titles and full text of legislation. The total number of EU legislative acts pertain-
ing to a sector indicates the level of EU regulation. This is one of our ‘demand’
hypotheses. As noted in the theoretical section, this hypothesis is not bound to
the particular period of study. Table 3 in the Appendix (see Supplemental Data)
provides a full overview of the search terms used in this analysis disaggregated by
economic sector.
Second, the DG policy areas are linked to economic sector by a conversion
table (see Table 4 of the Supplemental Data). Data on spending per DG
were gathered from the DG Budget website from the ‘Annual accounts of the
European Union financial year 2009’.7 This pertains to the ‘policy activity’
hypothesis. Data on staff were collected from DG Human Resources and Secur-
ity based on the ‘Statistical bulletin: personnel of the Commission bulletin for
personal, October 2009’.8 These numbers are used to operationalize the infor-
mational needs of administrators.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We first present descriptive statistics and then present several multivariate
regression models (negative binomial) on the density per economic sector.
Table A1 in the Appendix (see Supplemental Data) provides descriptive stat-
istics for the variables used in the analysis with the dependent variable in the
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first row. These statistics were calculated for the 57 sectors included in the ana-
lyses that follow. Additionally, Figure A1 in the Appendix (see Supplemental
Data) shows the distribution of the number of actors per sector (the dependent
variable). This variable has a typical lopsided distribution, with a large number
of sectors having only a few lobbyists in the European Parliament and a smaller
number of sectors having a high number. This is in line with previous findings
of the distribution of actors across economic sectors in the EU (e.g., Messer et al.
2010). Table A2 in the Appendix (see Supplemental Data) gives an overview of
the correlations between the variables. The strongest correlation (–0.54) is that
between the logarithm of the number of enterprises and the turnover or gross
premiums written per enterprise. The correlation between these two conforms
to our expectations regarding the interrelatedness of the constituents and sector
wealth hypotheses, not to mention the use of the first variable in the construc-
tion of the second.
The dependent variable, the density of actors present in a sector, is a count
variable, and consequently we estimate the models that follow using appropriate
count modelling techniques. As can be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix (see
Supplemental Data) the dependent variable is over-dispersed. Therefore, we
estimated the models using negative binomial regression that provide efficient
estimates even in the presence of over-dispersion. The model diagnostics of
these negative binomial models further indicate the presence of over-dispersion,
confirming the appropriateness of the technique.
Table 1 shows the estimated coefficients for three negative binomial models
along with their incidence rate ratios (IRRs).9 Model 1 tests the supply-side
hypotheses in the absence of the demand-side variables: the logarithm of the
number of enterprises to test the constituents hypothesis, the turnover or
gross premiums written (in hundred millions of euro) per enterprise to test
the wealth hypothesis, and within-EU direct investment flows (in billions of
euro) to test the market integration hypothesis. In the absence of controls,
the results show no support for the supply-side hypotheses.
To the variables pertaining to interaction among interest organizations,
model 2 adds the proportions of institutions and the presence of umbrella
groups within a sector. These variables represent the organizational interaction
component of the supply-side and both are highly significant (p , 0.01). A 1
per cent increase in the share of institutions within a sector increases the
expected number of organizations by approximately 2 per cent. The presence
of an umbrella group increases the expected number of organizations by
more than 13. The model shows some support for the constituents hypothesis,
with the logarithm of the number of enterprises now significant at p , 0.1. An
increase of 1 in this logarithm increases the number of organizations by 11 per
cent. In sectors with a large share of institutions, the logarithm of the number of
enterprises is lower, so the positive effect that this has on the dependent variable
is significant only after controlling for the percentage of institutions in a sector.
In model 3, we add the demand-side factors: the number of legislative acts (in
thousands), the average budget of relevant European Commission DGs, and the
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Table 1 Interest group density across sectors (unstandardized coefficients from negative binomial regression)
(1) IRR (2) IRR (3) IRR
Supply-side factors
Logarithm of the number of enterprises 0.09
(0.07)
1.09
(0.07)
0.11∗
(0.06)
1.11∗
(0.06)
0.10∗∗
(0.05)
1.11∗∗
(0.06)
Turnover or gross premiums written per enterprise 0.20
(0.22)
1.24
(0.27)
0.22
(0.17)
1.25
(0.21)
0.30∗
(0.16)
1.34∗
(0.21)
EU direct investment flows 0.04
(0.03)
1.04
(0.03)
0.03
(0.02)
1.03
(0.02)
0.04∗
(0.02)
1.04∗
(0.02)
Percent of institutions in sector 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00)
1.02∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.00)
1.02∗∗∗
(0.00)
Presence of an umbrella group 1.32∗∗∗
(0.25)
3.73∗∗∗
(0.94)
1.28∗∗∗
(0.24)
3.60∗∗∗
(0.88)
Demand-side factors
Number of legislative acts 0.00
(0.01)
1.00
(0.01)
Average DG budget –0.88∗∗∗
(0.41)
0.41∗∗∗
(0.17)
Average DG staff size –0.74
(0.54)
0.48
(0.26)
Constant 1.40∗
(0.77)
4.05∗
(3.13)
–0.66
(0.73)
0.52
(0.38)
4.22
(3.15)
68.25
(214.8)
Alpha –0.32
(0.21)
0.73
(0.15)
–0.85∗∗∗
(0.23)
0.43∗∗∗
(0.10)
–1.08∗∗∗
(0.24)
0.35∗∗∗
(0.08)
Observations 57 57 57
Deviance 65.72 60.48 58.62
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.09 0.11
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p , 0.10, ∗∗ p , 0.05, ∗∗∗ p , 0.01.
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average staff size of those DGs. Of these, only the average budget is significant
(at p , 0.05) and has a negative effect on the number of organizations within a
sector. Increasing the average budget for DGs of importance to a sector by 1
billion euros leads to a 59 per cent decrease in the number of organizations.
In other words, a one standard deviation increase in this variable centred on
its mean is associated with a decrease of 15 in the number of organizations.
We are not sure about the interpretation of this counterintuitive finding. It
may be that budgets are used to fulfil the informational needs of administrators
and that, consequently, DG’s with substantial budget do not ‘demand’ input
from interest organizations. However, we use staff numbers to account for this
phenomenon and these are not significant. Our impression is that the particular
distribution of governmental resources (budget, staff, regulatory power) across
the DGs in the EC does not precisely reflect substantial information needs or
governmental demand for lobbying. At the same time, we find some support
for all three supply-side hypotheses in the presence of these demand-side vari-
ables. The constituents hypothesis is again confirmed by the significance of
the logarithm of the number of enterprises (p , 0.05). An increase of one in
the logarithm of the number of enterprises results in an 11 per cent increase
in the number of interest organizations present in a sector. Sector wealth is
also significant (p , 0.10), providing support for the wealth hypothesis. An
increase of 100 million euros in turnover or gross premiums written increases
the number of interest organizations present in a sector by 34 per cent. We
also see some support for the market integration hypothesis, as EU direct invest-
ment flows is modestly significant (p , 0.10). A 1 billion euros increase in EU
direct investment flows is associated with a 4 per cent increase in the number of
organizations. Both the share of institutions and the presence of umbrella groups
remain significant at p , 0.01. This final model, which allows us to assess the
effects of all three types of explanations while controlling for the others, is also
the best fit, with a pseudo-R2 of 11 per cent.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We started this contribution with the question of why there are larger numbers
of interest organizations in some economic sectors than in others. The strongly
skewed distribution of variation in group density is one of the most consistent
findings in interest group population research (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech
2001; Halpin 2011). Consistent with the state of the literature, we also
found such a pattern in our data on the door pass register of the European Par-
liament. The contribution of our study lies in the combination of factors we
explore that are used to explain this variation. Much of the recent literature
highlights either demand- or supply-side factors as the major source of this vari-
ation. And, in the EU case especially, demand-side factors seem to be especially
popular (e.g., Coen and Katsaitis 2013). This is not surprising. The EU,
especially the European Commission, is known for its institutional structuring
of the interest group environment through subsidies, access provision and the
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opportunities for venue shopping associated with multi-level policy processes.
This might well lead one to focus almost exclusively on demand-side factors
in explaining cross-sector variations in density. Further, scholars might simply
prefer to focus on a single source of explanations because it eases both the
design and execution of the research. This is especially the case given the
several ways interest populations might be divided into subpopulations
around policy fields, economic sectors or interest guilds. Quite simply, for
each of these divisions, certain explanatory factors are more accurately measured
and have a more direct causal link to density values. Nevertheless, we think that
an exclusive focus on supply- or demand-factors (or population-related factors
in between) always misses important explanatory factors. In theoretical terms,
this largely means that interest group scholars, including those studying the
EU, should (also) be attentive to the social and economic forces that drive poli-
tics, rather than narrowly focusing on the policy process. Such a policy focus,
more specifically, does not do justice to the specific market dynamics that
may underlie the mobilization of interests in the European Union – in addition
to any institutional demand factors. We therefore integrated demand- and
supply-side potential explanations into our model and linked observations
across legislative areas, administrative units and economic sectors in a novel way.
Our results reflect our integrative effort. We find support for supply-oriented
explanations of group density. First, we find that the structure of the economic
sectors from which interest organizations are drawn matters. The structure of
the market, indicated by the number of enterprises and the turnover per enter-
prise, affects the number of interest organizations in a given economic sector.
This is consistent with, among others, the findings by Lowery et al. (2005:
68). The number of potential constituents of a certain interest, if at a declining
marginal rate, and the amount of ‘slack’ resources available per constituent
produce larger numbers of interest organizations. Also, higher levels of
market integration at the European level lead to higher group densities.
Second, in terms of more direct supply factors, economic sectors also differ in
the extent to which individual companies or semi-public organizations choose
to lobby collectively or individually. We indeed find a positive relationship
between the proportion of individual institutions within an economic sector
and the density of organizations representing it politically. It seems that the pro-
verbial bandwagons are often loaded with individual companies. Indeed, our
results for the presence of umbrella groups suggest that these companies jump
on the bandwagons because they take cues from umbrella groups, as suggested
by Halpin (2011: 221–2), rather than the umbrella groups acting as substitutes
for lobbying by individual companies and other institutions. However, this
observation requires further research. In contrast to previous policy issue-level
theories and findings, the phenomenon observed here pertains to economic
sectors and seems to be of a more structural nature; that is, umbrella groups
may signal more general political interest to member firms rather than short-
term, issue-oriented lobbying that is the focus of, among other researchers,
Baumgartner et al. (2009: 252–3). In sum, the structure of economic sectors
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– both in more distal terms, such as number of potential constituents or its rela-
tive wealth, and more proximate terms, such as the presence of umbrella groups
– seems to have a great deal to do with the density of interest organizations in an
economic sector.
In contrast, we find inconsistent evidence for the effect of demand factors
commonly addressed in the literature. This is somewhat surprising for the
case of the EU, where such demand forces might be expected to be especially
powerful. None of the estimates for number of legislative acts, DG budgets
and DG staff size were discernibly different from zero. This suggests that
models of group density that are inattentive to supply forces are likely to be
somewhat underspecified. We know that interest group density affects other
aspects of interest representation, such as the nature of dominant strategies
and, perhaps, influence. This implies that incomplete explanations of density
potentially affect studies on strategies and influence. The specification of
models of group strategies and influence may be improved by including
measures of the several aspects of the organizational environment that we
have identified as supply factors, such as the density of organizations in the econ-
omic sector in which it is active or the proportions in institutions in its immedi-
ate environment. More generally, this might well mean that as political
scientists – folks who are likely to be especially receptive to ‘political’ expla-
nations rather than ‘economic’ ones – we may be biased toward accounts
that represent only a small portion of the real story accounting for variations
in the densities of interest representation across economic sectors.
Finally, a couple of cautionary remarks on the reliability and validity of our
observations are in order. First, policy sectors, economic sectors and interest
guilds can only be linked in an imperfect manner. Their empirical relationship
is fluid, overlapping and sometimes very indirect. This means that our results
rely on a selection of sectors only. Second, the market structure variables only
pertain to the ‘business economy’. For many sectors, these variables are
missing owing to the reporting practices of Eurostat and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the national agencies
on which they rely. Third, we only assess economic sectors, not social or public
sectors. This means that our findings apply to only about half of the EU interest
group population. It may be that similar supply- and demand-factors affect the
mobilization of non-economic interests, but we cannot tell from the research
presented here. This means that any influence of density patterns in ‘social’
or ‘public’ sectors on various economic sectors remains unobserved. Consider-
ing well-known counter-mobilization processes, such influences are plausible.
Fourth, we need to acknowledge that the data available to us to examine
demand-side effects were of a somewhat cruder nature than our supply-side
data. Hence, whereas the five supply-side factors are measured directly at econ-
omic sector level, key demand-side variables rely on measures at the relevant DG
policy area level, which is subsequently linked to economic sectors. For all of
these reasons, we are not yet ready to fully argue in favour of the full inclusion
of supply-side explanations on various aspects of lobbying, including interest
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system density. But demand-side factors clearly need to be examined in the
context of models that are more fully attentive to the powerful forces of
supply that condition responses to political events.
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NOTES
1 See: http://www.intereuro.eu/. The logic and structure of this project is described by
Beyers et al. (2014).
2 Please note that we are talking about market integration rather than policy inte-
gration.
3 Please note that we use the term ‘institutions’ in the same manner as Salisbury (1984),
including among others ‘individual corporations, state and local governments, uni-
versities, think tanks’ and various other non-membership organizations (64).
4 As a robustness check, we also assessed our regression models using 2008–10 density
data. This does not substantially change the results presented.
5 ISIC stands for International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
Activities and is the statistical standard proposed by the United Nations. For
precise descriptions of each sector, please see http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/
regcst.asp?Cl=27. The use of the ISIC scheme makes it possible to use data collected
by Eurostat. Please note that ISIC (rev. 4) is consistent with the EU-standard NACE
(rev. 2). NACE stands for Nomenclature statistique des activite´s e´conomiques dans la
Communaute´ europe´enne.
6 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports
on a broader range of sectors in their Structural Analysis (STAN) and Structural
and Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS) datasets. However, these datasets still
do not provide sufficient information on the number of enterprises per sector in
all EU countries.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/2009/EU_final_accounts_2009
_en.pdf.
8 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/mb/html/index.en.html.
9 While there are good reasons for preferring the precision of a polynomial test (Lowery
et al. 2010), it is also true that such tests always raise issues of collinearity. This proved
especially severe in our case. Thus, we opted for a simpler test of the density depen-
dence hypothesis by including logged values of both number of enterprises and econ-
omic value added in the model (see MacArthur and Wilson 1967).
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